INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Annual Lecture to be presented to the Society for Advanced Legal Studies was given by Cherie Booth QC on 29 October 2001.
On the second day of this month, the Human Rights Act turned one.
On this, the anniversary of its commencement, it is timely to look back and reflect on its first year. For lawyers and judges alike, the Act has clearly been the "tidal wave" that Lord Woolf predicted would transform the legal landscape. It certainly has had a revolutionary effect on our way of thinking and has proved to be the single most significant change to legal practice since the invigoration of equity into the common law so many centuries ago.
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Its substantive social effect has been similarly pervasive. Unquestionably, it has done far more than provide the field day for crackpots, the pain in the neck for judges and legislators, and the goldmine for lawyers that Lord McCluskey so pessimistically predicted of it. The passing of the Act has plainly led, in many cases, to the recognition and protection of fundamental rights that would have otherwise gone unrecognised and unprotected. And importantly, it appears that the Human Rights Act has begun to pervade society at large, not just our courtrooms. Its existence and the concepts that underpin it are beginning to become increasingly familiar and recognised in the community as a whole. That is what is truly needed if the Act is to achieve its ultimate aim, of creating a more equal and just society in which human rights are respected as a matter of culture and of course.
Aside from its social impact, the Human Rights Act experience in the last twelve months makes for an interesting legal analysis for us as administrative law practitioners. In particular, with the coming of the Human Rights Act we have seen the true coming of the proportionality principle, a concept that has, for some time, hovered at the edges of administrative law. That is so 7 o even though the word "proportionality" is to be found nowhere in the text of the Human Rights Act itself nor in the Convention. But quite clearly proportionality now lies at the heart of the Act and, for the first time, is the subject of daily debate in our courts when decisions of public authorities are under review.
It is the intention of this paper to:
Explain the context in which human rights cases arise;
briefly introduce the concept of proportionality;
provide a synopsis of its traditional role in British law;
briefly study its interpretation in some foreign jurisdictions; and analyse its application by UK Courts under the Human Rights Act in the last twelve months.
This, it is hoped, will not only be of interest to administrative law practitioners who regularly litigate or advise on cases involving the Human Rights Act, but to all administrative law practitioners given the possible impact the Act in bringing proportionality to the fore may have on the traditional grounds of judicial review.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCE
As any cursory examination of the human rights cases decided in the last twelve months will reveal, at the heart of the HRA lies a search for the fair balance between rights and freedoms. 1 As we all know, rights and freedoms are rarely absolute concepts. It is truism that the freedom of one person to swing their arm extend where another person's nose begins. Rights compete against each other, and against the interests of society of a whole. The right to privacy conflicts with the right to freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial with the interests of society in convicting criminals. Human rights are rarely, if ever, black and white issues rather, they involve difficult and often controversial value judgments upon which reasonable minds may differ. Lord Steyn eluded to this when he made the following comments in Brown, 2 a case decided under the Human Rights Act shortly before last Christmas: These competing rights and interests are balanced, and measured against each other, by applying the principle of proportionality. The European Court of Human Rights explained the underlying essence of the principle in the Soering case 3 when it said that the court must: Reduced to its simplest form, the principle requires that interference with a Convention right be proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued by interfering with the right. As the Court of Appeal said in May in Aston Nantlow, it "calls for consideration of the appropriateness of the measure to the need which it is designed to meet". 4 Thus, judges are now required to assess the protection of rights within a framework of community interest. The legitimacy of the aim pursued by the legislation or decision in question must now be considered openly and expressly by the court in all cases that come before it. This is a rather significant change from the traditional basis for judicial review the famous Wednesbury test5 that allowed the court to intervene in an administrative decision only if the decision was, on its face, so perverse or irrational that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it. The nature of this change is discussed further below.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN BRITISH COURTS
British courts have traditionally not had much occasion to develop a jurisprudence of proportionality because, unlike many European jurisdictions such as Germany and France, lack of proportionality is not a ground upon which an administrative decision can be directly challenged in this country. Although in 1984 Eord Diplock suggested that it could be adopted as a free standing ground for judicial review in English law, 6 and despite many other calls by judges and commentators tor it to play such a role, Although these comments remain true, it is important to emphasise, as Lord Slynn did in Alconbury^ and Lord Justice Waller did only a fortnight ago in the recent McLellan case, 14 that proportionality does not require, nor justify, merits review. The Human Rights Act is not a mandate for the courts to step into the shoes of the decision-maker and substitute their own decision if they disagree on the merits, in every case that comes before them. Quite rightly, the courts to date have followed the general Strasbourg approach and recognised that the degree to which the merits of the decision itself requires review will depend, among other things, on the nature of the right in dispute. 15 In some cases, the Courts have considered it to make its own decision on the merits as part of its reviewing process, 16 but in other cases the courts have applied a test closer on the spectrum to the Wednesbury reasonableness test and illustrated that, even applying proportionality, deference to the decision-maker is the proper course in many cases. 17
THE CHALLENGE TO BRITISH COURTS
Despite this overlap and despite the perhaps subtle influence of proportionality in traditional judicial review, it has never been a concept applied directly in British administrative law.
That is not to say that direct application of the concept is totally new for British courts, for they have on occasion been required to apply proportionality in the EC law context, where it is a fundamental principle. 18 But it is really not possible to say that the English courts have had opportunity to consistently apply the doctrine of proportionality to a variety of factual scenarios. That is why the Human Rights Act, in making it a central principle, has presented such a monumental challenge to our lawyers and to our courts.
There is, however, certainly no shortage of international jurisprudence available to guide English courts as they develop an English jurisprudence of proportionality under the Human Rights Act. Obviously, the concept has been at the heart of the European Convention since its inception and the European Court of Human Rights has produced a generation of case law interpreting and applying it. And as well as playing an important role in the administrative law of many European countries, proportionality is a concept which has been interpreted and applied in Canada, New Zealand and South Africa under their various human rights instruments. To these jurisdictions, this paper will turn shortly. But first, it is logical to inspect the application of proportionality by the European Court under the Convention.
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights is often required to assess whether the interference with a qualified human right can be justified as being "necessary in a democratic society". Because the doctrine of proportionality is applied in making that assessment, it has become an inherent part of the Convention jurisprudence. Is the interference complained of corresponded to a pressing social need?
Is the interference proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued? And Are the reasons given to justify the interference relevant and sufficient?
The ECHR jurisprudence has also made it clear that proportionality is applied with varying degrees of strictness depending on the particular context of the case: in those cases where fundamental rights are involved, the court applies a more stringent test in those cases where property rights are involved than those in which mere property rights are concerned. 21
And, although it is not explicitly recognised by Convention case law, in practice the court often applies what has been termed by commentators as the "least restrictive means" test, whereby the court will deem a measure disproportionate if the objective sought to be achieved could in fact have been achieved by a measure causing lesser impact on fundamental rights. 22
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
The jurisprudence of proportionality in Canada has resulted from the need to decide disputes arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights, which guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it but "only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
Similarly, in New Zealand, the Bill of Rights provides that its rights and freedoms "may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
In South Africa, section 35(1) of the Constitution contains a similar proportionality test, but one which is more explicit in outlining the relevant factors to be considered by the court. It provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights: In all three of these jurisdictions, the courts have applied their expressions of the proportionality principle in a very similar manner, which in turn closely resembles the application under the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights. The principles to be distilled from the case law of these jurisdictions suggest that, for a measure
to be proportionate, a number of conditions have to be satisfied:
(1) the objective sought to be achieved is necessary, is the sense that it is pressing and substantial and sufficiently important to possibly justify interference with an individual's right or freedom;
(2) the measure interfering with the fundamental right is rationally connected to that objective; (3) the measure is necessary to achieve the objective, in the sense that it is the least drastic measure that could possibly be employed to achieve the objective; and (4) the restriction is proportionate (in the strict sense of the word) to the measure in that it does not impose harm that is excessive to the importance of the objective.
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: THE EXPERIENCE SO FAR
So, what has the experience here been? How have the British courts applied proportionality in the last twelve months? Have they followed Convention jurisprudence and the approach in New Zealand, Canada and South Africa?
It is timely to look at some of the decisions.
Mclntosh
The judgment of the Privy Council in the Mclntosh case23 was handed down in February. The case concerned the appeal of a Scottish man who had been convicted of supplying heroin. Following his conviction, "confiscation proceedings" were commenced against him to strip him of the assets he generated by supplying drugs.
Under the Scottish legislation that authorises such proceedings, the court is permitted to draw assumptions that certain assets possessed by the convicted person are the product of his or her drug crimes, and order the confiscation of those assets accordingly.
Mr Mclntosh argued that these assumptions, which the legislation permitted the court to draw, violated one of the or ' "fair trial" rights under the European Convention, namely his right under Article 6(2), which provides:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved Quilty according to law. "
Mr Mclntosh argued that, if assumptions about the connection of his assets to his illegal activity could automatically be made adversely against him, he was, in effect, not being presumed innocent such that Article 6(2) had been violated.
Although the Privy Council decided that Article 6(2) did not in fact apply to Mr Mclntosh at all because the proceeding was not on in which he was "charged with a criminal offence" nevertheless it went on to consider whether, if it did apply, Mr Mclntosh's Convention rights would have been violated. In doing so the Court noted that what was required was a balancing act a need to measure the general interest of the community in discouraging drug crime and stripping offenders of assets earned by that crime, against the right of an individual to a fair trial.
The Privy Council held that, in the circumstances of this case, the legislation's intrusion on the presumption of innocence was proportionate. The Privy Council noted that the degree to which the legislation impaired the presumption of innocence was relatively small the presumptions against the defendant could only be made in circumstances where he had already been convicted of a serious crime, and the defendant could rebut these presumptions with evidence.
On the other hand the other half of the balancing o exercise the aim pursued by the legislation was a legitimate one. The Privy Council commented that drug trafficking is a very serious social evil and noted that offenders notoriously hide their proceeds, thereby concluding that the legislation furthered the legitimate aim of protecting the community. On the balance, when the legitimate aim was measured against the degree of intrusion on the individual's right, the legislation was held to be proportionate.
It is important to note that the Court emphasised that the right given by Article 6(2) is not an absolute one, but rather one which could be qualified in the context of a legitimate community interest. There is a connection between the qualified nature of a right and the extent to which it may properly be violated.
Brown
The Brown case24 concerned a Scottish woman who was suspected of stealing a bottle of gin from a 24-hour store. When the police arrived at the store, she suggested to Miss Brown argued that the legislation that required her to answer the police officer's question as to the identity of the driver of the car was contrary to Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which reads: However, like in Mclntosh, the court held that the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination were not absolute, but rather could, depending on the degree to which they were violated and the legitimacy of the goal pursued by doing so, be qualified.
The Privy Council in this case applied a similar reasoning process as was later applied in the Mclntosh case.
Here, the Privy Council thought that the rights were not severely impaired because:
Firstly, the answer to the question itself, without more, could not convict the accused. It related only to the identity of the driver and not the nature of the driving. It was only if it could also be established that Miss Brown had been drinking that she could be convicted;
Secondly, there was in this case no suggestion that she had been coerced into providing the answer, so that its reliability was not in dispute;
Thirdly, the power could only be exercised by or on behalt ot a chief officer of police; and Fourthly, the admission was not necessarily final and conclusive.
Applying the balancing exercise, the Privy Council thought that the intrusion on the presumption of innocence was not a disproportionate legislative response to the problem of road safety, and that an appropriate balance had been struck between the interests of the community in preventing drink driving and the right of the individual to a fair trial. Lord Steyn, in reaching his conclusion, -referred to statistics on the number of fatal and serious car accidents in recent years. The use of this type of social data is something that will no doubt become common in deciding HRA cases in which a proportionality judgment is required.
Wilson
A case in which the interference with the right was considered disproportionate to the objective pursued by such interference was Wilson, 2^ decided by the Court of Appeal in May 2001. The Court was required to consider the compatibility with the Convention of provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which had the effect that if a pawnbroker did not ensure that loan documentation was completed in the prescribed manner, he or she lost the ability to enforce the security for such loan. The court noted that the objective being pursued that of ensuring customers of pawnbrokers turned their attention to the terms and conditions of the contract was a legitimate one, the measures taken by the Parliament to achieve that objective were not proportionate to it. Even recognising that it is appropriate to defer some degree of latitude to Parliament, the Court of Appeal held that the inflexible measures taken by Parliament here were excessive. The Court was unable to deduce why Parliament though it J o necessary to impose such drastic consequences upon the pawnbroker for a failure to ensure paperwork was fully completed; there were other less drastic measures, such as judicial control, to protect the rights of customers. Although the Court of Appeal did not explicitly refer to it as such, the decision exemplifies the "least drastic measure" test applied in other jurisdictions. 26 The balance had not been appropriately struck and, because the court was unable to give an interpretation to the provision which would make it compatible with the Convention, the Court of Appeal issued a declaration of incompatibility in relation to it, one of only three such declarations issued to date.
Proportionality was also found to not exist in the case of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billeslev Parochial Church
Council v Wallbank and another, 2 ' 1 a case decided in May. In this case the freehold owners of certain glebe land o challenged their liability under an old common law to pay the costs of keeping the parish church in repair. The court noted that this liability' was imposed arbitrarily and discriminatorily, for the obligation to pay had no necessary connection with the parish itself. The Court queried whether the common law rule in question violated the Convention, and said:
"The turns on proportionality. Proportionality, in the jurisprudence both of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, calls jor a consideration of the appropriateness of the measure to the need which it is designed to meet. The need here is the legitimate one of maintaining historic buildings in the public interest. The means employed, however, are a tax . . . levied exclusively on the owners of the land which hasjor centuries been divorced from the system of rights and responsibilities with which ecclesiastical law clothed the rectories of which the land once formed part. " 28
The court again without specifically referring to the principle as such seems to apply some form of the "least drastic means" test, by referring to fact that the state possesses a large choice of measure to control the use or r o property or to redistribute wealth. It would have been possible for the state to achieve its legitimate objective of upkeeping historic buildings by imposing one of many other forms of taxation in which a closer relationship was achieved between the form of taxation and that objective.
In R v A, Lord Hope of Craighead seemed to expressly endorse the "least drastic measure" test: The courts have rightly recognised that in some fields more than others, Parliament should be granted a degree of latitude. Where the issue at stake is one in which Parliament has specifically considered and legislated specifically to reflect the will of the electorate, the courts are less likely to declare the measure disproportionate. 34 Where, however, the courts are themselves most qualified to judge the necessity of a provision, such as those which regulate court procedure, or where the interference relates to a fundamental right of high constitutional importance such as the right to freedom from torture, the courts will afford Parliament a lesser degree of latitude. These comments show that the approach of British courts under the Human Rights Act will be similar to that adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court under the Canadian Charter, expressed in the following words: Interestingly, though, the House of Lords in R v A was not in agreement as to whether the issue in question was one in which Parliament, or the Courts, were most qualified to decide on the appropriate balance between rights and community interests. In that case, the issue was
whether it was legitimate for legislation to preclude an accused charged with rape from cross-examining the or o complainant about her sexual history. Lord Hopehead concluded that the areas was one where Parliament was better equipped than the judges to decide where the balance lay; in his opinion it was a highly sensitive and carefully researched field which involves an assessment of prejudice to wider interests of the community, and that it was an important factor for Parliament to consider the extent to which restrictions were needed in order to restore and maintain public confidence. 41 Lord Steyn however noted that in a criminal statute when the question arises as to whether Parliament has made excessive inroads into the right to a fair trial, the court is qualified to make its own judgment and must do so. 42
And while the courts have shown a willingness to defer to Parliament, they have also made it clear that they will not do so blindly and that they are prepared to analyse the reasons Parliament considered a particular measure necessary. The courts have emphasised that deference is not the same as unquestioning acceptance. In Wilson for example, the court noted:
"It is one thing to accept the need to defer to an opinion which can bee seen to be the product of reasoned consideration based on policy; it is quite another thing to be required to accept, without question an opinion for which no reason of policy is advanced. " 4T he court in that case attempted to understand why Parliament had enacted what it considered to be an excessive measure to achieve its objective, but being unable to answer that question after looking at material such as Parliamentary debates, it concluded that the measure was disproportionate. In contrast, in R v Lambert and others, Lord Woolf expressly stated that he could "well understand" why, in light of the legitimate social aim being pursued, Parliament interfered with the right in question in that case and the manner in which it did so.
The line between proper deference to Parliament, and improper intrusion on the sovereignty of Parliament and discretion of a decision maker, is a fine one. On the right Although these comments were made in the context of rejecting proportionality as a new ground of judicial review, the dangers of which Lord Lowry warned remain relevant under the Human Rights Act. Proportionality can be taken too far and the courts must be wary not to go too far, even under the greater scope afforded to them under the Human Rights Act. A degree of judicial reticence is required. The courts should not see the Act as a licence to superimpose their own opinions for those of Parliament or decision-makers, for a margin of discretion should remain with them. The extent of that latitude will depend on many factors, such as the nature of the fundamental right in question, but as Lord Steyn pointed out in Da/y,45 under the Human Rights Act there has not been a shift to merits review.
The roles of judges, legislators and administrators are distinct and must remain so. This is inherent in the entire scheme of the Human Rights Act.
AN IMPACT ON THE TRADITIONAL BASIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
So it is clear that proportionality lies at the heart of the Human Rights Act, and that our courts are applying die concept consistently with the manner in which it is applied under Convention law, and in foreign jurisdictions. And it is possible that, as our courts become more comfortable with the concept, proportionality may begin to pervade areas of law other dian human rights. In particular, despite the views of those such as Lord Lowry who have voiced fears of the danger of doing so, it may be that the Human Rights Act is the catalyst that causes proportionality to be accepted as an independent head of judicial review in administrative law. 
